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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND

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ATOMIC ENERGY ACT - 1946
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JSPOG AJK/aid

10 March 1951

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FROM: CINCFE TOKYO JAPAN

TO: DEPTAR WASH D C . . . . . PRIORITY

INFO: CG FEAF TOKYO JAPAN . . . . . PRIORITY (COURIER)

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Personal for JCS. Reference JCS message 82782, 6 Feb 51, CINCFE C54985, and SAC Deployment Plan 40-51. Current revision of FEC Plan "UNDERSHOT," including evaluation of the circumstances in which it might be applied, raises vital questions that seem to warrant consideration by the JCS.

In the event of a general emergency, it is assumed that a primary purpose of the Soviets in the Far East will be to diminish the contribution of Japan to the Allied war effort. Should war occur during the forthcoming 12 to 18 months, it appears that Japan may emerge as the most substantial single ally of the United States. Indeed, should Great Britain suffer seriously disruptive attack, Japan may remain the only major industrial complex oriented in support of the cause of the United States. In any event, the security of Japan is of high importance to U.S. war aims.

The converse of these considerations is an even more critical prospect. Should the Soviets succeed in gaining control of Japan, the essential industrial element would become associated with Communist-dominated sources of raw materials in Asia. Moreover, a war-competent population of over 80 millions would be available to the enemy. A huge increase in the war potential of the Communist world would ensue.

It was no doubt with those thoughts in mind that the Soviets have stationed offensive forces of great magnitude in Siberia. While FEC does not discount the capabilities of the Soviet ground forces in Siberia, it is the Soviet Air Force which poses the most immediate threat. To positively neutralize the potential contribution of Japan to the American war effort, the Soviets must either gain physical possession of Honshu or disrupt Japan by heavy and continuous attack. Either method depends for success on the ascendancy of Soviet air power in the Far East. To achieve this ascendancy, Joint Intelligence estimates that the Soviet Far

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East Air Force disposes of approximately 4500 combat aircraft, constituting a numerical total nearly four times that of FEAF, SAC and NAVFE aircraft. This disproportion is the more aggravated by the apparently inevitable advantage of the initiative which is held by the Soviets. It seems more than an even chance that the initial attack of the enemy would be directed at FEC air power. Every practicable precaution is being taken to mitigate the effect of the potential Soviet blow. However, commitments of the FEC to operations in Korea prevent optimum defensive measures. As a result, substantial losses among air elements must be anticipated.

The foregoing factors compel the conclusion that extraordinary opposing action must be taken immediately on the outbreak of general hostilities. Accordingly, the FEC has prepared and keeps under continuous review plans to launch an immediate counter air offensive employing all available forces. The lack of balance existing between FEC air forces and those of the potential enemy indicates that additional power will be needed on D-Day.

SAC deployment plans indicate a commitment of atomic elements to the Far East. Although the execution of SAC strike plans will contribute considerably to the mission of the FEC, these operations would be greatly magnified as assistance if they could be executed on D-Day. Equally, should atomic bombs be made available to CINCFE in an "on call" status, the application of some of these to Far East targets on D-Day would powerfully enhance our chances of success. There is no doubt that atomic attacks on main Soviet control centers such as Vladivostok, even though not directed specifically at their air forces, would have a major blunting effect on Soviet offensive capabilities. Such attacks executed on D-Day would provide optimum assistance to the FEC. The degree of assistance would deteriorate with each day of delay. It is recognized that there are advantages to be gained through simultaneity in the application of the first wave of atomic bombs to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Far East, however, is a land island, connected to the heartland of the Soviet empire by lesser communications than tie Japan to the United States, and is not an integral part of the Soviet industrial complex. Moreover, the portion of the overall atomic strike allocated to the Far East is a very minor percentage of the total. Delaying atomic operations in the Far East in order to gain simultaneity in the overall attack would add little to the magnitude of the shock; executing atomic operations in the Far East on D-Day would add greatly, perhaps decisively, to the execution of the mission of the FEC. Therefore, it is requested that the capability to execute atomic attacks on D-Day be established as soon as possible. The FEC will

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accommodate itself to any requirement essential to this objective. Signed MacArthur.

OFFICIAL: APPROVED:

K. B. BUSH
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